Abstract Darjeeling, a district in the Himalayan foothills of the Indian state of West Bengal, is a former colonial "hill station." It is world famous both as a destination for mountain tourists and as the source of some of the world's most expensive and sought-after tea. For decades, Darjeeling's majority population of Indian-Nepalis, or Gorkhas, have struggled for subnational autonomy over the district and for the establishment of a separate Indian state of "Gorkhaland" there. In this article, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork conducted amid the Gorkhaland agitation in Darjeeling's tea plantations and bustling tourist town. In many ways, Darjeeling is what Val Plumwood calls a "shadow place." Shadow places are sites of extraction, invisible to centers of political and economic power yet essential to the global circulation of capital. The existence of shadow places troubles the notion that belonging can be "singularized" to a particular location or landscape. Building on this idea, I examine the encounters of Gorkha tea plantation workers, students, and city dwellers with landslides, a crumbling colonial infrastructure, and urban wildlife. While many analyses of subnational movements in India characterize them as struggles for land, I argue that in sites of colonial and capitalist extraction like hill stations, these struggles with land are equally important. In Darjeeling, senses of place and belonging are "edge effects": the unstable, emergent results of encounters between materials, species, and economies.
station itself has long been cherished by Indian elites as well as foreign and domestic tourists as a place of attachment, celebrated for the "natural" beauty of its mountain vistas. The situation in contemporary Darjeeling highlights how places of attachment and shadow places are rarely so neatly split as Plumwood describes. Darjeeling is a celebrated place of beauty for some and a place of extraction and displacement for others.
Most importantly for my argument here, Darjeeling has also become what Plumwood calls a "homeplace," a place of attachment, for the descendants of the Nepalis conscripted more than 150 years ago to build the hill station and the region's plantations. To understand belonging in the hill station, then, it is necessary to attend to how places of attachment and shadow places can be entangled in a single location. Though British capital has long dried up, Darjeeling Nepalis, who refer to themselves as Gorkhas, today still find themselves working to maintain Darjeeling's colonial infrastructure and to keep its plantations viable.
5 They work to ensure that Darjeeling remains both a livable home and a commodified landscape. Belonging-making one's home in a shadow place-is difficult. Questions about the rights of Gorkhas to place are bound up with questions about the ecological effects of plantation monoculture, the sustainability of forests, and the appropriateness of a sprawling city in the steep Himalayan foothills.
In order to make claims to belonging in Darjeeling, Gorkhas must reconcile the "split"
that Plumwood identifies in contemporary place discourse, between "conscious dwelling places" and "disregarded places of economic and ecological support." 6 Gorkha claims to belonging are thus as much about environmental justice as they are about identity politics.
Since the mid-1980s, political parties in Darjeeling have been agitating for the creation of an Indian state of Gorkhaland. Instead of being a district within the state of West Bengal, as it is currently, Gorkhaland would be its own state within India, controlled by the region's Nepali majority. In 2007, a newly formed political party, the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha, or GJMM, reignited the Gorkhaland agitation. As I show in the next section, Gorkha politicians deploy a political choreography that in some ways echoes the narrow one-to-one/people-to-place bioregionalist discourse of place that Plumwood critiques. For example, in a 1987 pamphlet, The Voice of Gorkhaland, party leader Subhash Ghisingh wrote: "Only the ethnic name of a place or land . . . can germinate the real sense of belonging in the conscience of the concerned people." 7 Gorkha political rhetoric highlights a singularity of place and people-a Gorkhaland.
My intention in this article is to highlight moments in Gorkha life that exceed bioregionalist political rhetoric. This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork I carried out during the most intense period of the latest subnational agitation-nearly three 
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In what follows, I describe three struggles with land. First, I examine the divergent ways that tea plantation workers, politicians, and environmentalists experience and explain the problem of landslides. Second, I describe how, in the 1980s, plantation residents and villagers began moving to Darjeeling town. Environmental activists and longtime town residents blame these people for speeding the decay of urban infrastructure.
Third, I discuss an overlap between Gorkha politics and wildlife conservation discourse.
Frequent associations between the protection of Gorkha people and the protection of endangered indigenous animals-particularly red pandas-elide everyday encounters between townspeople and urban "pest" animals, particularly macaque monkeys and street dogs.
Through these examples, I aim to bring attention to what literary critic Rob Nixon calls the "ecological ordinary," the "quotidian," historically and geographically particular interactions between people, things, and nonhuman creatures that tend to defy easy political representation. 11 Gorkha land and Gorkha identity, I argue, can be seen as "edge effects": the unstable, emergent results of encounters between ecosystems, species, and ways of occupying space. In ecology, the term edge effect references contact be- In the decades after annexation, Nepali labor recruits were tasked with the crafting of an extractive landscape composed of "settler" crops. Foremost among these was tea, the Camellia sinensis variety, smuggled from China by British bioprospectors. They also included the Japanese conifer Cryptomeria japonica, prized for its evergreen look and its soft wood, which made ideal packaging for exporting tea; and Cinchona, the South American tree whose bark contains the antimalarial chemical quinine. These plants were cultivated in vast monocultures while a leisure industry grew up to commodify the mountain landscape that formed their backdrop. In both the leisure and agricultural economies, ideas about Nepali men and women as endowed with natural proclivities to certain kinds of labor were central. In what Piya Chatterjee calls a "colonial taxonomy of labor," nineteenth-century British texts characterized Nepalis as "good workers." 15 Nepali men, described as amiable, brave, and industrious, were recruited into special "Gurkha" army regiments, and Nepali women, considered exotic and comely, remain favored hires in domestic service to this day. In the case of Gorkhaland place discourse, the official singular place is that of a homogenous homeland for Gorkha people. Overcoming the "split" in discourses of belonging between "dwelling places" and shadow places means attending to "all those places that bear the ecological traces of one's passage, or that carry the ecological impacts of supporting . . . life."
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In the examples below, I focus on people attending to those contradictory timespaces of belonging. I focus on "slow" environmental justice struggles that do not figure into representations of subnational movements in the press or in much scholarship.
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Bringing Plumwood's place discourse critique to bear on subnational belonging allows us to see past "land" as an inert backdrop for an ethnic and political movement or as a movement's collective object of desire. This is the world of the "ecological ordinary," marked by struggles with land rather than for land. Amid struggles with land, singularity is undermined and subtly critiqued by nonelites in Darjeeling. Of course, ecologically ordinary events can become ecologically spectacular, but only for a time. parties. At times, Gorkhas have styled themselves as stewards or guardians of land, but in the contexts of the landslides and urban instabilities I discuss below, they have just as often found themselves blamed-as laborers and urban settlers-for land degradation.
As Tania Li has recently argued, while processes of resource extraction-including plantation agriculture-situate land as a simple economic resource, "land is not like a mat. You cannot roll it up and take it away. It has presence and location. It has an especially rich and diverse array of 'affordances'-uses and values it affords to us, including the capacity to sustain human life." 25 In shadow places like hill stations, the protracted process of resource extraction, urban decay, and interspecies conflict can sap land's sustaining capacity, making it a source of danger and anxiety. The concept of struggles with land, then, can aid in understanding how land's dual role as both productive and destructive force shapes senses of belonging. Thinking about struggles with land can also reveal the difficulties of making and maintaining home in a shadow place. This dual role is most visible at edges: of plantation and forest, of plantation and town, and between species.
Soils and Stabilities
GJMM bandhs made strategic use of Darjeeling's topography and geopolitical significance. They halted the circulation of people and things up and down the two main roads that connect the region to the rest of India. Though tea was sometimes brought into the remit of bandhs, more often it was quietly exempted. The exception for tea seems surprising, given its prominence in popular imaginaries of the region. One explanation I often heard from Darjeeling residents regarding the exemption of tea was that GJMM politicians were bought off by tea plantation owners. Another explanation had to do with a combination of instrumental and symbolic politics. At an instrumental level, a total blockade of tea would mean lost wages for tea plantation workers, leading to an erosion of the GJMM's support base. At a symbolic level, Darjeeling tea-a nationally and globally recognized brand-said what GJMM politicians alone could not about the region's distinction. The GJMM's own symbolic displays frequently included images of tea leaves and tea workers (see figs. 1 and 2). As a political tactic in the struggle for land, the GJMM's careful manipulation of ukaalo/oraalo flows of both symbols and commodities was in keeping with subnational land struggles elsewhere.
Tea plantation workers, on the other hand, had to work with land to manage flows of things and people. Each afternoon, women plantation workers carried tea to access roads, where it was carted down to factories for processing before moving on to the market center of Siliguri in the plains. The trucks that plied these roads always came up empty, but they left full of tea. Medicines, water, and construction materials, mandated by Indian labor law, rarely came up. A victory for the GJMM, workers told me, would not directly change much about this uneven flow.
25. Li, "What Is land?" See also Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan, Agrarian Environments.
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When I asked about the GJMM's repeated refusal to directly address working conditions on tea plantations, one worker said, simply, "That is not important." Under Gorkhaland, she said, "the plantation-the factory and other things-will be the owner's, but the whole land becomes ours. . . . That means that the soil is ours too. The owner will need to pay us [in taxes]. . . . It's like this, at that time Darjeeling tea will become Gorkha Darjeeling tea, because we Gorkhas are working. But the land is not the owner's." Tea workers had a stratigraphic understanding of subnational politics. For them, Gorkhaland named not only a struggle for autonomy over place and resources as well as a means of controlling their flow through territory but also a struggle with the soil underneath tea.
Workers were well aware of the problems of plantation monoculture on steep Himalayan foothills, both within and beneath the "factory and other things." Tea plantation owners in the early 2000s were intensifying production to meet increasing international demand. Workers found themselves being asked to plant tea in areas where they had never planted it before, such as recently cut-back forests and steep gullies (jhorā s). Amid this intensification, ukaalo/oraalo movements signaled a different kind of anxious belonging.
One geologist writing about Darjeeling described the region as being in "quasiunstable equilibrium," meaning that any amount of rainfall at any point could result in The location of this landslide is significant. On plantations, forests mark property lines, but they also provide crucial protection during the yearly monsoons. Older plantation managers told me that forest cover was crucial in locations where it was "too steep to plant": at the tops of ridges, at the bottoms of ridges, and in the jhorā s. Laborers on Ambootia and other plantations lived in villages situated sometimes above, but more regularly below, tea fields. On plantations, edges of all kinds mattered. When the rows of planted tea began to lose their linear, contoured structure-when they began to dip and sag-workers saw a signal of impending danger. Underneath the tough, gnarled bushes that workers clung to as they pulled their way across shear slopes of tea was something dangerously soft. The demands of labor and agricultural intensification made landslides-either pre-existing or potential-a matter of considerable concern.
Workers traveled from villages to different parts of plantations each day to pluck tea.
During the monsoon, those who lived farther "down" in valleys risked both contributing Landslides can be ecologically spectacular. They can cause death and destruction, but more often, they are ecologically ordinary: they go unnoticed or are ignored by those in power (and are certainly ignored by tea-consuming publics abroad). 28 According to Bishnu and Monu, two women tea workers I interviewed, before the GJMM took control in 2007, nobody came down to the plantation when landslides caused damage.
They joked that the GJMM leadership-in their big new SUVs and fancy new clothesonly "came down" to look at their problems. Politicians made a spectacle of their visits, but the end result was largely the same:
Bishnu: We know that they are doing very well now because, say, if we have some problem they come down and they look. They look around. Besky / The Land in Gorkhalandmountainsides. Though post-agitation migrants and the descendants of plantation workers bore much of the blame for these problems, these people, organized into urban "wards," were the foot soldiers of the revived Gorkhaland movement. One person from each household had to attend every GJMM rally.
A high-visibility occupation of town was key to the GJMM political agenda. Unlike the previous incarnation of the movement in the 1980s, which held rallies in the Chowk Bazaar, or "Down Bazaar," a market lower down the ridge, GJMM activists held their speeches and events at the top of the ridge, in a plaza called Chowrasta. The
Chowk Bazaar was the social and economic center of what is colloquially called "down-
town," where non-British settlers in Darjeeling lived during the hill station period.
Chowrasta was the center of "uptown," the all-white section. Today, though the growth of urban and peri-urban bustis has contributed to a breakdown of stark class and racial distinctions between "downtown" and "uptown," Chowrasta remains, as in the colonial period, the tourist center of Darjeeling. Looking out into the distance from Chowrasta, foothills blanketed with verdant tea bushes appear to undulate for miles, contained only by misty Himalayan peaks. But looking directly down the mountain and toward the Chowk Bazaar, the ridge is so congested that it is sometimes hard to see where a given structure meets the ground.
Most every GJMM rally I observed began downtown and snaked up the ridge to
Chowrasta. Speeches blaring from loudspeakers tied to bamboo rigging celebrated the unity of Gorkhas and their distinctiveness from other people in West Bengal. Behind the symbolic claims to Gorkha unity, however, lay a messier class and racial politics within Darjeeling town.
Again, an oraalo/ukaalo discourse was salient. Getting off plantations and "up" into a house and job in town was a common aspiration among younger tea plantation residents, but those who did get up faced new forms of ecological and economic marginali- Aila struck during the height of the GJMM's agitation, but in the aftermath, politicians, environmentalists, and residents struggled over how to characterize the event.
News reports documented deaths in Lower Tungsung, but the extent to which human action-including by the Gorkha leaders who had long encouraged settlement in these areas-could be blamed for the disaster remained a point of debate. After all, cyclones, like landslides, have been part of life in the hills since long before the Gorkhaland agitation. At one GJMM "cultural program" held in the aftermath of Aila, a leader of an ethnic samaj (organization) put it this way:
There was an Iron Age, a Stone Age, an Ice Age. You know what our age would be called?
The age of plastic litter . . . But it is much more than that. In the cities, plastic may be an aesthetic issue, but in the hill station, it is a "life issue." It is in the jhorā s, in our jhorā s, in our drains, in our landslides-the landslides that kill our people. . . . We [are] making such a thing that goes against [nature] and that is dangerous to nature . . . the very thing which Darjeeling has given us.
Attempts to contextualize the loss of housing and life brought questions of ecological belonging together with questions of political belonging. Plastic was a "life issue"
because the mass discarding of jhorā -choking waste-much of it at the hands of tourists who came to Darjeeling to consume "nature"-threatened the very existence of Darjeeling town dwellers. Consumption and risk were unevenly distributed in Darjeeling.
35. Ibid., 519.
In the wake of Aila, however, activists seemed more willing to weave the instability of land-and the problematic edge effects of hill station development-into narra- Once we get a state of Gorkhaland, the decision making process will be here in Darjeeling, not in Calcutta. . . . In disaster management, it is not sympathy, it is empathy [that is needed]. It is about place. Calcutta will not bother, because it is not their brothers. So empathy means-suppose I am the Secretary concerned and whatnot, and I know my people are dying. They are my relations, so I will work faster. The disaster management plan will be prepared by Darjeeling people, who have experience with how to handle the landslides, so they know that dhoti is not the item, or a cycle is not the item.
The idea of a specialized Gorkha disaster management system, however, was a minority current in the movement. After the end of the second Gorkhaland agitation in 2011, the new Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA) was formed, promising increased autonomy and local control over Darjeeling's resources. But when I returned in the summer of 2012, three years after the disaster and a year after the formation of the GTA, many residents of Lower Tungsung had yet to see any material or monetary relief, while others had received pittances for their destroyed houses. The party continued to come down and look around, but even those visits eventually waned.
Species Struggles
Among GJMM activists, discussions of "nature" and the dangers posed to it by urbanization were not limited to the problem of waste in jhorā s. Images of Kanchenjunga (the world's third highest peak), snow leopards, rivers, and tea bushes were prominent both in environmental programs organized by NGOs and in GJMM depictions of Gorkha "heritage" (see fig. 1 ). The endangered red panda was a particularly prominent symbol (see fig. 3 ).
In wild, according to the zoo official, meant that it was "our job" to help conserve them.
They were an integral part of the Darjeeling Himalayan ecosystem. In the official's narrative, the underpopulation of red pandas came as a result of the overpopulation of Nepalis, specifically their historical and contemporary encroachment on the forest, the construction of tea and timber plantations, and the continued expansion of the town into red panda habitat. Since the 1990 Rio Earth Summit, the zoo representative explained, preservation of endangered species had become the responsibility of the local people where those species are indigenous. Being "native" to the region necessitated caring for "native" species. She explained, "This means the red panda must be in Darjeeling. . . . Animals must be kept where they are found."
In this presentation and in GJMM political rallies, "saving" the panda and protecting Gorkha "heritage" were couched as a cosmopolitan responsibility, just as it was a responsibility to keep waste out of jhorā s. In what Nixon calls an "eco-archaic" discourse, those species that belonged needed to be conserved, paradoxically, alongside the remains of colonial architecture.
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Despite their prominence in GJMM symbolism and local environmentalist discourse, most Darjeeling residents rarely saw red pandas face-to-face. They had almost daily encounters, however, with two decidedly less charismatic megafauna: macaque monkeys and street dogs. Unlike red pandas, these species had no trouble reproducing.
They were problematically numerous. Many of Darjeeling's macaques live at the Buddhist-Hindu Mahakhal Temple, the site of an old monastery on the highest point in town, just above Chowrasta. This monastery, the popular local narrative goes, was called the Dorje-ling monastery (in Tibetan, dorje is a ritual thunderbolt, and ling means "place"). It was one of the only structures whose presence the British acknowledged when they annexed Darjeeling.
The temple monkeys are sacred, and their belonging predates both colonial and Nepali settlement. For people in Darjeeling, then, macaques are deeply problematic. Tibetans sell curios, sweater vests, and souvenirs. These human-dog-monkey encounters are edge effects. These ordinary encounters are difficult to readily define as political through the lens of a singular place discourse. Amid environmental degradation, they remain in the shadows, behind iconic images of towering peaks and cute red pandas.
Conclusion: Inheriting the Hill Station
In her work on shadow places, Plumwood critiqued the romanticism that undergirds bioregionalist discourses of place and belonging. Plumwood's aim was to denaturalize the romanticized sense of attachment to mountains, rivers, and forests that tends to come with a privileged place in the global economy. Plumwood's critique, however, also allows us to understand the experience of place and belonging for less privileged people, like Gorkhas, who find themselves put to exploitative work on the very land they claim as "home." In this article, I have argued that place and belonging are both edge effects. They emerge at the points where senses of attachment intersect with the "shadowy" work of extraction.
Landslides, urban waste, and interspecies encounters in Darjeeling underscore
Plumwood's critique of a "split" in contemporary place discourse. These events both 45. Stoler, "Imperial Debris"; Freccero, "Carnivorous Virility."
challenge the existence of a singular, discrete "homeplace" and raise questions about what it means to belong in a disconnected and denuded "shadow place." 46 To move between homeplace and shadow place, Gorkha people need travel no farther than the distance from plantation village to urban busti. Darjeeling's existence has long been predicated on the provision of goods and services for places elsewhere-from the colonial metropole to the global market. The presence of settlers there is marked by ecological instabilities that exist in tandem with feelings of "anxious belonging," precarious senses of Indian citizenship. 47 In giving some material sense of that anxiety, I want to prompt a closer consideration of the instability of place in subnational politics. In the Himalayas, land is always in the process of "going down"-occupied, eroded (and occasionally reconstituted) by both human and nonhuman territorial action. As Plumwood notes, just as we should never take identity for granted, we should not take the ground on which people contest and rework representations of themselves as stable or uniform. 48 Just as concerns about ethnic or national identity are inflected by conflicts over framing, tactics, and knowledge, concerns about place are complicated by the overlap between environmentalism, imperial debris, and even the status of land and animals as sacred, dangerous, natural, or threatened.
Darjeeling is thus an appropriate site not just for rethinking belonging but for examining the processes by which people encounter the temporally problematic "edge effects" of colonial monoculture and urban underdevelopment. The history of hill stations (and of capitalism more broadly) reveals that the seams, or the "unruly edges," in Anna Tsing's terms, where forest meets field, where town meets plantation, and where land meets sky, afford extraordinary accumulative possibilities, even if they are also extraordinarily precarious. 49 People in Darjeeling, as I have argued, have inherited the hill station, and with it these edge effects. The ways in which they confront them can enrich approaches to justice and injustice on the margins of South Asia and beyond.
Stopping the downhill loss of land and people, resources and capital was not only a strategy of GJMM political action but also a desire of nearly all of the people in Darjeeling whom I met during my fieldwork. Gorkhaland as a place is not a unified entity but one that is worked over with edges-not just the contact zones where species meet but the ecological zones where forests and monocultures meet and the temporal zones where movements to conserve imperial debris become wedged into movements to preserve an ancestral "homeland." Making subnational demands does not mean blurring these edges but attending to them. Besky / The Land in Gorkhaland
